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6.1  Introduction 
Aging is one of  the most challenging problems facing contemporary 
Japanese society. According to the 2000 population census, the elderly 
(aged sixty-five and over) as a fraction of the population reached 17.4 per- 
cent in 2000. The elderly fraction is projected to accelerate and reach 27.0 
percent in 2017, meaning that the elderly will make up more than one- 
quarter of the Japanese population.' Although aging increases the demand 
for nursing care services, until quite recently the family network played the 
traditional primary role in providing care for the frail elderly. However, 
changes in the social structure, such as weakening community ties, nu- 
clearization of the family, and feminization of the workforce, have made 
the financial and psychological burdens of family-based care for the aged 
unbearably large. 
In response to the expanding elderly population and the increasing de- 
mand for social nursing care services, the Public Nursing Insurance Act 
(Kaigo Hoken Ho)  was formally enacted in September 1997. Under this 
legislation, the Ministry of  Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) intro- 
duced a new public long-term care insurance system in April 2000. This 
new system aims to respond to society's major concerns about aging and 
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to assure citizens that they will receive care, if necessary, and be supported 
by society as a whole.’ 
According to the MHLW statistics, the supply of care services expanded 
after implementing the insurance ~ystem.~  However, the effects of market- 
oriented  reform  on  service quality  and efficiency are unknown.  More 
specifically, we do not know whether introducing competition by expand- 
ing the number of providers in an area can simultaneously improve the 
quality of service and management efficiency. 
Due to the lack of microlevel panel data spanning the transition period, 
this paper will use cross-sectional data to investigate the effect of market 
concentration on the quality and cost of home help  service^.^ We choose to 
focus our analysis on home help services because the reforms in this mar- 
ket have been dramatic, and the proportion of for-profit providers5  is one 
of the highest among the at-home nursing care businesses. 
The number of home help service providers (henceforth referred to as 
care providers) per thousand elderly will be employed as an index of mar- 
ket concentration. To  evaluate the impact of market-oriented reform on 
service quality and efficiency, it is important to know whether care pro- 
viders in unconcentrated (i.e., highly competitive) markets have a higher 
level of quality and efficiency than those in highly concentrated markets. 
This information is also helpful for determining the appropriate number 
and scale of operations of care providers in each district. 
No academic studies have been done on the relationship between mar- 
ket concentration and quality of service or management efficiency among 
home help providers in Japan.6  According to the Survey of Nursing Care 
Management7 (Kuigo Jigyo Keei Jitu Chosa) 2002 by MHLW, the higher 
the market competition (or, the fewer users per care facility) the higher the 
costs per care plan. This suggests that competition among care providers 
may lead to higher management costs, which is reminiscent of the “med- 
ical arms race hypothesis” in hospital industry research. This paper shows 
that this finding does not hold in the context of the home health industry 
when we  use an appropriate econometric framework to control for the 
effect of other related factors such as the quality of service. 
2. See Abe (2003) for a detailed description of the nursing care system. 
3. For example, from April 2000 to February 2002, the number of providers registered in 
WAM-NET doubled, from 9,185 to 18,389. 
4. Home help service is one of the most important categories of at-home nursing care ser- 
vices. See appendix A for an introduction to the institutional setting of the at-home nursing 
care business. 
5. According to the Survey of Nursing Care Facilities 2000 by the MHLW, 30.3 percent of 
home help providers were for-profit companies in December 2000. 
6.  Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) investigated the impact of ownership and years in oper- 
ation on cost and quality using a data set similar to ours. 
7. According to the survey results, cost per care plan varies with the number of users per fa- 
cility. The average cost per care plan in facilities with fewer than 20 users was 12,955  yen, while 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides a theoretical back- 
ground and reviews previous empirical research on quality and efficiency 
issues. Section 6.3 describes the survey data used in this study. Section 6.4 
develops the econometric method for estimating the quality and cost func- 
tions. Section 6.5 presents empirical results. Specifically, after proposing a 
set of indices to measure the quality of services, it explores the relationship 
between market concentration and the quality of services. Section 6.5 also 
evaluates the effect of market concentration on management after adjust- 
ing for quality of services and other related factors. Section 6.6 concludes. 
Appendix A outlines a set of original indices for measuring quality of care 
services. Appendix B presents a brief description of the institutional set- 
ting of the at-home nursing industry in Japan. 
6.2  Previous Research 
Theoretically, market concentration in an otherwise perfectly competi- 
tive market is generally understood to weaken competition and to have un- 
desirable effects on service quality and management efficiency. However, it 
is also frequently argued that consumers do not necessarily benefit from 
competition among service providers. The medical care industry is one rel- 
evant example. It differs from traditional industries in three aspects: insur- 
ance coverage (for most services), the prevalence of nonprofit providers, 
and the agency role of physicians and medical care staff. Consequently, 
hospitals tend to  compete with each other on nonprice aspects. This waste- 
ful competition is colloquially referred to as the  “medical arms race” 
(MAR).*  According to the MAR hypothesis, hospitals compete by provid- 
ing too many high-technology medical services and hiring excess staff. At 
the same time, unnecessary duplication of services may cause the quality 
of care to drop as providers fail to take advantage of the scale of learning 
effect9  (Robinson and Luft 1985; Robinson 1988; Hersch 1984; Luft et al. 
1986). Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) find evidence consistent with the 
MAR hypothesis and infer that, as a result, hospitals compete on quality 
instead of price. 
Although most of the nonprice competition literature falls into the pre- 
ceding categories, there are some exceptions. After taking into considera- 
tion local population structure and market structure, the model of Dra- 
nove,  Shanley, and  Simon (1992) casts doubt  on claims that hospital 
mergers increase efficiency by reducing competition. In addition, Shortell 
and Hughes (1988) employ in-hospital mortality as an index of quality of 
service and find no significant association between quality of service and 
8. For a more comprehensive review, see Dranove and White (1999). 
9. “The scale of learning effect” refers to the inverse relationship between an  organization’s 
size and the cost of organizational knowledge. Hence, a market with only one supplier maxi- 
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market concentration. Kessler and McClellan (1999) even find a negative 
relationship between heart attack mortality and the Herfindahl index in 
United States since 1990, suggesting that competition led both to substan- 
tially lower costs and to significantly lower rates of adverse outcomes. 
Literature on the effect of market concentration on the cost of nursing 
home care is quite limited. Assuming the presence of endogenous and un- 
observed quality, Gertler and Waldman (1992) investigate the effect of 
cost-saving public policies on the quality of nursing homes using the sur- 
vey data of New York State. They find that the increases in competition are 
associated with higher levels of both quality and cost, and that a 1 standard 
deviation reduction in competition will reduce costs by about 20 percent 
but reduce quality by only 2.5 percent. Nyman (1994), on the contrary, 
finds that policies designed to control government expenditure by limiting 
the number of nursing home beds in an area may result in excess demand 
and discourage effort by nursing homes to improve management efficiency. 
Because higher prices may cause private patients to exhaust their financial 
resources  and become  Medicaid  patients  sooner  than  they  otherwise 
would,  policies that  limited competition  may  have  had  indirect  cost- 
increasing consequences. 
Few empirical studies have examined the effects of Japan’s new “dereg- 
ulation” policies on the quality and cost of home help services. It should be 
emphasised, however, that even with the new deregulation policies, the 
prices of home help services are largely fixed in Japan, resulting in a mar- 
ket that is far from perfectly competitive.1°  Because providers are unable to 
attract customers with lower prices, competition for customers centers on 
advertising or kickbacks to administrative organizations, leading to higher 
cost without commensurate benefits such as improvement of service qual- 
ity (Nanbu 2000). Thus, in the case of Japan’s home help industry, although 
we  expect a positive effect of market competition on service quality, we 
cannot predict whether market competition will drive up costs. Hence, it is 
extremely important and worthwhile to examine these phenomena empir- 
ically. 
6.3  Data 
The sample is drawn from the Survey of the Environment Surrounding 
Home Help Providers, conducted by the Bank of Japan and one of the au- 
thors (Suzuki) in August 2000. First, 1,200  providers in Kanto district were 
selected by  the method of population weighted stratified random sam- 
pling.” Then questionnaires were sent to each of 1,200 selected providers, 
10. The prices of nursing care services are set in detail by the MHLW. The standard prices 
vary with the type of service, time of day, qualifications of the home helper, and municipality. 
11. The distribution of samples by prefectures is as follows: Ibaragi: 80; Gunma: 61; Tochii: 
62; Chiba: 174; Saitama: 201; Tokyo: 372; and Kanagawa: 250. The Japanese Home Help Industry  151 
and 445 valid responses were collected (response rate 37.1 percent). Al- 
though some providers are running subsidiary businesses such as at-home 
bathing or day service, the survey gathered information on management 
costs and outputs relating solely to the home help business. 
The 445 providers in the sample are classified by ownership, with the re- 
sults summarized in table 6.1. The ownership composition in our data is 
very similar to data obtained from the nationwide provider census, with the 
one difference being that providers in our sample consist of relatively more 
for-profit providers and nonprofit providers such as co-ops, agriculture co- 
operatives, and nonprofit organizations (NPOs). In addition, the share of 
social welfare associations and medical corporations is somewhat lower in 
our sample than in the nationwide data. 
Table 6.1  Distribution of providers by ownership category 
Our survey 
Ownership 
No. of  Nationwide 
observations  Percent  ("/I 
For-profit providers 
Stock corporations and limited 
Individuals 
Public providers 
Local public organizations" 
Social welfare associationsb 
Social welfare corporations (excluding 
Medical corporationsd 
Civil corporations" 
Other nonprofit organizations 
private companies 
Nonprofit providers 




























Source; Nationwide data are derived from the census data conducted by Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare in July 2000. 
"Local public organizations are corporations run by local governments directly. 
bSocial welfare associations are a kind of social welfare corporations that are run by local 
public organizations. Social welfare associations generally have some advantages in achiev- 
ing agential jobs or underlying subsidies from the local government but they must afford to 
embrace redundant staffs from local government as an exchange. 
'Social welfare corporations, established by individuals or organizations, are permitted to run 
social welfare business only. Although social welfare corporations can enjoy equipment sub- 
sidies from the government and receive certain tax benefits, they are prohibited to  make profit 
or own estates in personal equipment subsidies from the government and receive certain tax 
benefits, they are prohibited to make profit or own estates in personal name. 
dMedical  corporations are nonprofit organizations run by hospitals. 
"Civil corporations run public welfare businesses under the supervision of the regulatory au- 
thorities. Civil corporations may enjoy certain tax benefits but generally can not receive any 
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Our data include detailed information for each home help provider on 
subsidiary businesses, scale of operations, balance sheets, employee com- 
position, length of  operation, and operation costs. We  construct three 
measures of the output of home help services: total hoursL2  of physical 
nursing service, total hours of housework assistance service, and total 
hours of combination service (including both physical nursing service and 
housework assistance service). We  also construct a systematic index to 
measure the quality of services of each home help provider. Table 6.2 pre- 
sents basic descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis. 
6.4  Theoretical Models 
In this section, we develop two models, the first model focusing on pro- 
viders’ choice of quality and the second focusing on the costs of produc- 
tion and efficiency. Specifically, let the care demand function be 
(1)  Y = W,  Q,  Z), 
where Pis  the price charged, Q is quality, Z is a vector of exogenous variables 
that shift the demand curve, such as the competitiveness and demographic 
characteristics of the care provider’s local market. The cost function is 
(2)  C = C(Y,  Q,  W), 
where Y is the output of a specific care provider, and W is a vector of ex- 
ogenous factor input prices faced by the provider. In this analysis, output 
Y is classified into three categories: hours of physical nursing service (A), 
hours of housework assistance service (B),  and hours of combination ser- 
vice (C). The input vector W includes labor cost (labor cost/overall em- 
ployment hours) and administrative costI3  (administrative cost/overall em- 
ployment hours). 
Hence, care providers choose price and quality to maximize profits I 
(3)  I  = P . Y(P,  Q,  Z) -  C( Y,  Q,  W). 
The corresponding first-order conditions are 
ay  ac  jp.-=-  ar 
aQ=O  aQ  aQ’ 
We assume that output Y is exogeno~s’~  and that prices P  are fixed un- 
der the Japanese nursing care price system. Therefore, the equations (l), 
(4) 
12. Total hours  (number of users per month) X (visits per user per month) X (hours per 
13. Administrative cost includes the cost of renting office space, the cost of water and heat- 
14. Strictly speaking, Y is not exogenous even in the case of Japanese nursing care market. 
visit). 
ing, as well as the maintenance cost of automobiles. 
To make the model as simple as possible, we assume Y to be exogenous. Table 6.2  Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
Number of  Standard 
observations  Mean  deviation 
Total cost (in 10,000 yen) 
Wage (= labor cost/overall employment hours, in yen) 
Administrative cost (= administrative cost/overall 
Total hours of physical nursing service provided 
Total hours of housework assistance service provided 
Total hours of hybrid services provided 
Predicted service quality in terms of the total score 
Predicted service quality in terms of the score of the 
first principle factor (Qhat2) 
Length of operation (in years) 
Percentage of branch office 
percentage of providers in region 1 
Percentage of providers in region 2 
Percentage of providers running medical facility 
business simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running at-home assistance 
business simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running at-home bathing 
business simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running day care business 
simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running sales and lending 
business of welfare equipment simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running food delivery business 
simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running short-stay business 
simultaneously 
Percentage of providers running at home nursing and 
rehabilitation business simultaneously 
Percentage of regular customers 
Percentage of customers secured before the start of 
reform 
Percentage of customers in need of nursing care 
certified as band 3 or over 
Percentage of newer providers 
Percentage of for-profit providers 
Percentage of nonprofit providers 
Percentage of public providers 
Number of providers per thousand elderly 
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(2), and (4) can be solved for the endogenous variable Q in terms of exoge- 
nous variables Y,  W, and Z: 
(5)  Q = Q(Y,  W, Z) 
lowing functional form: 
(6)  Q, = a,,  + a,L,  + a2y  + Zp + u, 
where Lt  is the total labor hours, and Z is a vector of exogenous variables 
for each care provider that includes the market  competition level and 
dummy variables for whether the provider is nonprofit, public, new, or a 
branch office and dummy variables for region.15 
Turning to the estimation of the cost function, this analysis employs a 
quality-adjusted translog cost function. By  using the translog cost func- 
tion, we can make inferences about the principal economic effects without 
imposing restrictive assumptions on elasticities of substitution among in- 
puts or on returns to scale. The empirical counterpart of equation (2) is the 
following translog cost function: 
We choose to represent the equilibrium quality function (5)  using the fol- 
n  1 
(7)  log C = a" + a,  log Y + a,  log Q + C  a,,>r  log  + -  p,(lOg  Y)* 
I=  1  2 
1  1 
+ 2  p,,(log  Q)2 + -  c  C  pi,  In Y.  In W, + p,,  log Y log Q 
2i  j 
Because we are interested in the effect of Z, particularly market concen- 
tration, on cost, we employ Z as a vector of exogenous variables in the cost 
function as well. To be consistent with economic theory, the cost function 
should be linearly homogenous in input prices, and the cross-coefficients 
must be symmetric, which implies the following restrictions on equation 
(7): 
Using Shephard's Lemma, the optimal demand for the ith input is ob- 
tain by differentiating the cost function with respect to the price of the ith 
input (WL),  that is, the price of labor. Letting s, denote the cost share of in- 
15. There are three region dummies, defined to reflect details of the public long-term-care 
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put i and differentiating the cost function of equation (3) with respect to Wi 
yields the following structure of the cost shares: 
(8)  s,  = a,,,  +  P, log W, + PylL  log Y + P,,"  log Q + E,, 
J 
wherej  denotes the price of inputs other than labor. The cost equation (7) 
is estimated jointly with the preceding share equation (8) using nonlinear 
methods subject to the restrictions imposed previously. In particular, Q will 
be treated as an observed and endogenous variable to emphasize its role as 
a quality variable. Its predicted value (Qhat) obtained from the estimation 
of quality function, will be employed as an explanatory variable in the cost 
function.16 
6.5  Empirical Results 
6.5.1  Quality Comparisons 
Currently no uniformed  criteria  exist for determining the quality  of 
nursing services in Japan. For example, it is well known that the cities of 
Kobe and Yokohama and Hokkaido prefecture have designed their own 
sets of local quality criteria and used them in assessment activities. The 
questionnaire we  usedI7  includes fourteen indexes that could be measured 
objectively and precisely. For analytic convenience, we divided these four- 
teen indexed8 into four categories: quality management, service conven- 
ience, information service, and the skills of the home help staff. 
In the following we compare the average quality of services among care 
providers in a highly concentrated local marketI9  with their counterparts in 
a sparsely concentrated local market. It should be noted that the local mar- 
ket concentration is computed as the number of care providers per thou- 
sand elderly (age sixty-five or over), the elderly being the potential users of 
nursing care services in the area. Table 6.3 employs the four subindexes 
listed in appendix A to compare the mean scores of providers in the two 
different types of markets. Areas where the number of providers per thou- 
sand elderly is less than the median are categorized as highly concentrated 
(less-competitive)  markets. 
We prepared two sets of scores to measure the overall quality of care. 
16. Gertler and Waldman (1992) treat quality as endogenous, unobservable variable. 
17. Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) have used an even more comprehensive index derived 
18. See appendix A for detailed descriptions about the fourteen subindexes. 
19. The common assumption of local market is the municipality in which the care provider 
is located. There are certainly a few users whose care provider is located in a neighboring mu- 
nicipality, but we assume most users in Japan are using facilities inside their residence mu- 
nicipality. 
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Table 6.3  Comparison of quality of services by market concentration  level 
Providers 
Providers in  in highly 
All  low-concentrated  concentrated  Relative 
Subindex of quality of services  providers  market  market  score“ 
Quality management  2.20  2.24  2.10  +* 
Service convenience  2.84  2.89  2.74  + 
Information service  1.65  1.63  1.69  - 
Ability of the home help staff  1.88  1.87  1.92  - 
Total score  8.69  8.77  8.55  + 
Score of the first principle factor  0.000  0.037  -0.069  + 
Notes: We define markets where the number of care providers are less than the average level as highly 
concentrated (less-competitive) market, or we define the markets as low-concentrated (more competi- 
tive) ones. 
^In the last column of each score, “+” implies that the average score of providers in the low-concentrated 
market is higher than that in the highly concentrated market, while “-” refers to the reverse. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
The  “total  score”  is  calculated  by  simply  adding the  scores for  each 
subindex, and hence each query is equally weighted. The “score of the first 
principal factor” is estimated by principal factor analysis, where each in- 
dex was assigned different weights. In table 6.3, a “+” (‘‘-”)  indicates that 
the average score of providers in highly competitive (low-concentration) 
markets is higher (lower) than that of the providers in less-competitive 
markets. 
According to the results in table 6.3, for half of the subindexes the sign 
on the differences between types of markets supports the hypothesis that 
care providers in highly competitive markets are providing better services. 
Comparisons using the total score and the scores of the principal com- 
ponent, which are more comprehensive indices of quality, are in accor- 
dance with our expectation. The magnitudes of the quality gaps are quite 
small, however, and only the quality management subindex differs signifi- 
cantly  between  providers  in  high-concentration  markets  versus  low- 
concentration markets. 
The results in table 6.3 are informative but lack statistical significance 
and ignore important information because the market concentration vari- 
able is treated as a binary variable (above or below average). Furthermore, 
given that the service quality of care providers could be influenced by other 
factors besides market concentration, it is important to control for their 
separate effects using multiple regression. 
The quality function in equation (6) is estimated with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) using a Huber-White Sandwich estimator of the variance, 
which accounts for heteroscedasticity to some extent. Table 6.4 highlights 
the estimated coefficients on the market competition ratio (which equals The Japanese Home Help Industry  157 
Table 6.4  Estimation of service quality functions 
Competition level ratio 
Coefficient  t-value  Adjusted RZ 
Case 1: Quality management  -0.131  -0.58  0.173 
Case 2: Service convenience  -0.03  1  -0.12  0.087 
Case 3: Information service  0.273**  2.37  0.088 
Case 5:  Total score  0.110  0.29  0.117 
Case 4: Ability of the home help staff  0.122  1.17  0.110 
Case 6: Score of the first principle factor  0.097  0.56  0.180 
Notes: Estimations are based on the following equation: 
Q = p(0) + p(1) . ratio + p(2). nonprofitdummy + p(3) . publicproviderdummy 
+ p(4) .  newproviderdummy + p(5) . regiondummies + p(6) . branchdummy 
+ p(7) .  laborhours + u, 
where Q is the dependent variable that is the score of each subindex (cases 1 to 4), or the to- 
tal scores (case 5), or the principle component scores (case 6), and ratio is the number of care 
providers per thousand people in the population. This table highlights the estimated param- 
eters of ratio only. The equation in case 1 is estimated by OLS with a Haber-White Sandwich 
estimator of variance, and hence the heteroskedasticity of residuals is adjusted. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
the number of care providers per thousand population). The estimation re- 
sults present a somewhat different image from the descriptive statistics in 
table 6.3. Contrary to the results in table 6.3, the competition ratio has a 
positive effect on the third index of service quality, after controlling the 
effects of other covariates such as ownership dummy and region dummy. In 
other words, with all else held constant (scale of operations, region, and 
ownership), home help providers’ information services improve as market 
competition  rises. However, the competition ratio has no effect on the 
other three subindexes or the two comprehensive indexes. In sum, the effect 
of market concentration on service quality, if one exists, is quite limited. 
6.5.2  Efficiency 
Table 6.5 reports results of the translog cost function analysis, where 
case 1 employs the sum of total scores as an index of the quality of services, 
and case 2 employs the score of the first principal component as a proxy for 
quality of service. 
As shown in table 6.5, although there are some differences in the magni- 
tude of coefficients and t-values, we find no substantial differences  between 
the parameter estimates across the two cases. For the market concentration 
variable, which is our focus, both cases 1 and 2 indicate that an increase in 
competition is associated with lower cost. In other words, the statistically 
significant negative coefficient on the market concentration index indicates 
that the number of care providers per thousand elderly is negatively asso- 
ciated with cost. This result is in accordance with that of Nyman (1994), Table 6.5  Estimation of translog cost functions 
Case 1:  Case 2: 
Quality = total score 
Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Quality = first PC 
In (Total hours of physical nursing service) -  A 
In (Total hours of physical nursing service)"2 
In (Total hours of house work assistance service) -  B 
In (Total hours of house work assistance service)"2 
In (Total hours of hybrid services) -  C 
In (Total hours of hybrid services)"2 
In (A) . In (B) 
In (B) . In (C) 
In (C) .  In (A) 
In (Wage) or In (W) 
In (Wage)"2 
In (Admin. cost) or In (AC) 
In (AC)"2 
In (W) .  In (AC) 
In (A) .  In (W) 
In (B) . In (W) 
In (C) .  In (W) 
In (A) .  In (AC) 
In (B) . In (AC) 
In (C) .  In (AC) 
In (Qhat) 
In(Qhat)"2 
In (Qhat) . In (A) 
In (Qhat) .  In (B) 
In (Qhat) .  In (C) 
In (Qhat) . In (W) 
In (Qhat) .  In (AC) 
Length of operation 
Branch office dummy 
Dummy for region 1 
Dummy for region 2 
Dummy for medical facilities 
Dummy for at-home assistance business 
Dummy for at-home bathing business 
Dummy for day care business 
Dummy for sales and lending business of welfare 
Dummy for food delivery business 
Dummy for short-stay business 
Dummy for at home nursing and rehabilitation 
Proportion of regular users 
Proportion of users secured before 2000 




1.1850**  2.40 
0.0076***  3.17 
0.6675  0.86 
0.0015  0.61 
-0.0816  -0.11 
0.0074***  2.97 
0.0004  0.17 
0.0036  1.54 
0.0022  0.88 
2.2347***  3.59 
-0.0345  -1.57 
0.0508***  12.58 
-0.0164  -0.70 
-0.0322  -0.60 
0.0056  0.11 
0.0149  0.21 
0.0022  0.58 
0.0051  1.61 
0.0043  0.37 
79.5113***  4.45 
-0.3935*  -1.82 
-0.3095  -1.14 
0.0294  0.11 
-0.9191***  -3.05 
0.9191***  3.05 
0.0016  0.50 
-0.7974***  -6.36 
-0.7129***  -5.71 
-1.0610***  -7.21 
0.2362  0.79 
-0.0218  -0.24 
-0.0004  0.00 
0.1115  0.78 
-1.2347**  -1.98 
-12.4044***  -3.13 
-0.1727  -1.19 
-0.7331  -1.45 
0.0486  0.23 
0.0713  0.24 
0.0092  0.57 
-0.0089  -0.47 
0.0056  0.24 
0.9120**  2.51 
0.0062***  2.69 
0.8485*  1.66 
0.0010  0.43 
-0.5506  -1.06 
0.0062**  2.54 
0.0017  0.72 
0.0049**  2.12 
0.0031  1.30 
1.4320***  4.92 
-0.0310  -1.47 
-0.4320  -1.49 
0.0494***  12.70 
-0.0184  -0.82 
-0.0764  -1.39 
-0.0106  -0.21 
0.0682  0.95 
0.0023  0.60 
0.0063**  2.05 
0.0103  0.96 
46.1283***  5.18 
-0.2020  -1.27 
-0.5321***  -2.84 
0.1172  0.60 
-0.8286***  -4.51 
0.8286***  4.51 
0.0016  0.52 
-1.3453***  -8.81 
-0.5752***  -5.06 
-0.7165***  -5.70 
0.1609  0.56 
-0.0048  -0.05 
0.0334  0.30 
0.1815  1.30 
-8.4008***  -2.79 
-0.1826  -1.31 
-0.7025  -1.44 
0.0099  0.05 
0.0181  0.06 
-0.0 173  -0.93 
0.0075  0.49 
0.0140  0.63 The Japanese Home  Help Industry  159 
Table 6.5  (continued) 
Case 1:  Case 2: 
Quality = total score 
Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Dummy for newer provider  0.4581***  3.79  -0.1088  -1.01 
Quality =first PC 
Dummy for nonprofit provider  0.6459***  4.62  0.7016***  5.21 
Dummy for public provider  0.3718**  2.17  1.1954***  6.10 
Index of market concentration  -0.2815*  -1.65  -0.3813**  -2.31 
Constant  -108.1708***  -5.23  -42.0996***  -6.17 
R2 





Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total expenditure (In [C]) of individual provider. 
Index of market concentration refers to the number of care providers per thousand in each area. First 
principle factor has been transformed to suit for a log form. 
***Significant  at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
but as we mentioned in the introductory section, it is contradicted by the 
descriptive results of MHLW. 
The estimation of the cost function has some other interesting implica- 
tions. First, among the three kinds of home help services, only physical 
nursing service is significantly associated with higher cost in both cases. 
This result is consistent with the notion that physical nursing care is the 
most costly service among the three kinds of home help service. Second, 
running subsidiary businesses imposes no significant effect on cost. This 
result is somewhat surprising but suggests a lack of compensatory benefits 
between home help and other at-home nursing care businesses. Third, 
branch offices have lower costs than headquarters in both cases, with the 
possible reason being that the branch office requires lower costs for adver- 
tising, information collection, or employee training. Fourth, newer care 
providers are less cost-efficient than the older care providers (case 1 only), 
after controlling for ownership effect and quality of services. This result is 
quite natural because the newer providers require more initial investment 
cost than the older ones. In addition, coefficients on the nonprofit provider 
dummy and public provider dummy are positive and significant in both 
cases.*O This outcome is quite plausible because it is well known that non- 
profit or public providers generally lack incentives to minimize costs. Fi- 
nally, the coefficient on quality is positive and statistically significant, 
which implies that a tradeoff relationship exists between quality and cost. 
20. Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002), on the contrary, have reported a significantly negative 
relationship between public provider dummy and cost. 160  Yanfei Zhou and Wataru Suzuki 
6.6  Concluding Remarks 
Because of the dramatic aging of Japan’s population, the nursing care 
system in Japan has been reformed in order to stimulate the supply of care 
services and improve quality. This analysis focuses on the home help in- 
dustry and investigates whether market competition improves quality or 
reduces costs. 
This analysis contributes to Japan’s nursing care literature in the follow- 
ing aspects: first, it is the first study to use cross-section data to probe the 
relationships among market concentration, cost, and quality in an econo- 
metric framework. Second, it estimates the cost function while controlling 
for the effect of  quality, an observable and endogenous variable in our 
model. Hence, our analysis provides statistically reliable results. Third, it 
develops a set of comprehensive and systematic indices to evaluate the 
quality of nursing services, which could be a useful reference for govern- 
ment decision-making. 
Our major findings are summarized as follows: 
1. Holding constant the scale of operations, region, and ownership, we 
find a positive relationship between market competition and quality of ser- 
vices only in the case of information services. This result shows that the im- 
pact of market competition on the quality of care service, if any, was quite 
limited in 2000. 
2.  Contrary to the impression created by the descriptive results from the 
survey by MHLW, this analysis shows that competition is associated with 
lower costs. In other words, market competition induces cost savings in the 
home help care market. 
3. We also find that there is a tradeoff between quality and cost, running 
a subsidiary business has few cost-saving premiums, branch offices have 
lower costs than headquarters, and new providers and nonprofit providers 
incur higher costs than their counterparts. 
Turning to policy implications, although we hesitate to generalize our 
findings beyond the home help business,21  this paper suggests that there are 
no foundations for the concern that market-oriented reforms will sacrifice 
quality in the name of cost savings. 
21. Because the amount of competition in different areas may be correlated with unob- 
served characteristics that in turn affect cost and quality, we need some further tests to deter- 
mine whether cross-sectional analysis can be interpreted as informative on any causal rela- 
tionship between competition and cost and quality. Appendix A 
Table 6A.1  Measurement of the quality of service 
Items in each subindex 




Ability of home help staff 
Has your establishment 
acquired silver mark or IS0 
approval? 
Is your establishment settling 
no lower limits for utilization 
hours? 
Does your establishment 
designate staff to process 
claims from customers? 
Is the proportion of staff with 
the qualification of social 
welfare counselor, welfare 
caretaker, professional phys- 
ical therapist (PTCA), or 
operational therapist (OT) 
higher than the sample 
average? 
Does your establishment 
have a standard manual for 
home help service? 
Can your establishment 
provide nursing service late 
in the early morning or late 
at night? 
Does your establishment 
promulgate its service 
content through brochures 
or home pages on the web? 
Is the proportion of qualified 
staff higher than the sample 
average? 
Does your establishment 
regularly hold information 
exchange meetings, case 
study meetings, or care 
conferences? 
Can your establishment 
always meet emergency 
needs? 
Is the proportion of staff 
with more than five years’ 
experience as a home helper 
higher than the sample 
average? 
Does your establishment 
provide your own regular 
staff training? 
Can your establishment 
provide services on 
holidays? 
Is the proportion of staff 
with less than one year of 
experience as a home helper 
lower than the sample 
average? 
~~  ~ 
Note. “Qualified staff” refers to those who hold at least a certified qualification of second band home helper. 162  Yanfei Zhou and Wataru Suzuki 
Care 
Provider -  Insurance 
4 
Pay for the leftover 90% charge  Agency 
Fig. 6B.1 
Source: Ito (2001, 175). 
Flow of money and service provision 
Appendix B 
Institutional Setting of  At-Home 
Nursing Care Business in Japan 
In Japan, at-home nursing care services include a total of thirteen cate- 
gories: home help service, at-home bathing help, at-home nursing help, 
at-home rehabilitation help, outpatient rehabilitation help, at-home medi- 
cal care, management counseling, day-service, short-stay service, group 
homes for the elderly with dementia, long-term care at private home for the 
elderly, lending care equipment, and home alteration to meet care needs. 
Generally, users afford only 10 percent22  of the total cost as long as they 
do not break the upper limit of use rights, and other expenses are covered 
by  premium incomes (50 percent), central government subsidy (25 per- 
cent), prefecture  subsidy (12.5 percent) and municipality subsidy (12.5 
percent).23  Flow of money and provision of service is summarized in figure 
6B.1. In other words, at-home nursing business happens when eligible 
users apply for service through a mediation agency (care manager). Care 
providers serve the users based on the care plan made by the care manager 
and receive payment from both users and insurance agencies. 
22. There are upper limits for users’ burdens. 
23. To improve social welfare, some municipalities have additional subsidy for care pro- 
viders, which we define as government subsidies in the analysis. The Japanese Home Help Industry  163 
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